| #include "quiche/oblivious_http/buffers/oblivious_http_response.h" | |
| #include <stddef.h> | |
| #include <stdint.h> | |
| #include <algorithm> | |
| #include <memory> | |
| #include <string> | |
| #include <utility> | |
| #include "absl/status/status.h" | |
| #include "absl/status/statusor.h" | |
| #include "absl/strings/str_cat.h" | |
| #include "absl/strings/string_view.h" | |
| #include "openssl/aead.h" | |
| #include "openssl/hkdf.h" | |
| #include "openssl/hpke.h" | |
| #include "quiche/common/platform/api/quiche_bug_tracker.h" | |
| #include "quiche/common/quiche_crypto_logging.h" | |
| #include "quiche/common/quiche_random.h" | |
| #include "quiche/oblivious_http/common/oblivious_http_header_key_config.h" | |
| namespace quiche { | |
| namespace { | |
| // Generate a random string. | |
| void random(QuicheRandom* quiche_random, char* dest, size_t len) { | |
| if (quiche_random == nullptr) { | |
| quiche_random = QuicheRandom::GetInstance(); | |
| } | |
| quiche_random->RandBytes(dest, len); | |
| } | |
| } // namespace | |
| // Ctor. | |
| ObliviousHttpResponse::ObliviousHttpResponse(std::string encrypted_data, | |
| std::string resp_plaintext) | |
| : encrypted_data_(std::move(encrypted_data)), | |
| response_plaintext_(std::move(resp_plaintext)) {} | |
| // Response Decapsulation. | |
| // 1. Extract resp_nonce | |
| // 2. Build prk (pseudorandom key) using HKDF_Extract | |
| // 3. Derive aead_key using HKDF_Labeled_Expand | |
| // 4. Derive aead_nonce using HKDF_Labeled_Expand | |
| // 5. Setup AEAD context and Decrypt. | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2-4 | |
| absl::StatusOr<ObliviousHttpResponse> | |
| ObliviousHttpResponse::CreateClientObliviousResponse( | |
| std::string encrypted_data, | |
| ObliviousHttpRequest::Context& oblivious_http_request_context) { | |
| if (oblivious_http_request_context.hpke_context_ == nullptr) { | |
| return absl::FailedPreconditionError( | |
| "HPKE context wasn't initialized before proceeding with this Response " | |
| "Decapsulation on Client-side."); | |
| } | |
| size_t expected_key_len = EVP_HPKE_KEM_enc_len( | |
| EVP_HPKE_CTX_kem(oblivious_http_request_context.hpke_context_.get())); | |
| if (oblivious_http_request_context.encapsulated_key_.size() != | |
| expected_key_len) { | |
| return absl::InvalidArgumentError(absl::StrCat( | |
| "Invalid len for encapsulated_key arg. Expected:", expected_key_len, | |
| " Actual:", oblivious_http_request_context.encapsulated_key_.size())); | |
| } | |
| if (encrypted_data.empty()) { | |
| return absl::InvalidArgumentError("Empty encrypted_data input param."); | |
| } | |
| absl::StatusOr<CommonAeadParamsResult> aead_params_st = | |
| GetCommonAeadParams(oblivious_http_request_context); | |
| if (!aead_params_st.ok()) { | |
| return aead_params_st.status(); | |
| } | |
| // secret_len = [max(Nn, Nk)] where Nk and Nn are the length of AEAD | |
| // key and nonce associated with HPKE context. | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2-2.1 | |
| size_t secret_len = aead_params_st.value().secret_len; | |
| if (encrypted_data.size() < secret_len) { | |
| return absl::InvalidArgumentError( | |
| absl::StrCat("Invalid input response. Failed to parse required minimum " | |
| "expected_len=", | |
| secret_len, " bytes.")); | |
| } | |
| // Extract response_nonce. Step 2 | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2-2.2 | |
| absl::string_view response_nonce = | |
| absl::string_view(encrypted_data).substr(0, secret_len); | |
| absl::string_view encrypted_response = | |
| absl::string_view(encrypted_data).substr(secret_len); | |
| // Steps (1, 3 to 5) + AEAD context SetUp before 6th step is performed in | |
| // CommonOperations. | |
| auto common_ops_st = CommonOperationsToEncapDecap( | |
| response_nonce, oblivious_http_request_context, | |
| aead_params_st.value().aead_key_len, | |
| aead_params_st.value().aead_nonce_len, aead_params_st.value().secret_len); | |
| if (!common_ops_st.ok()) { | |
| return common_ops_st.status(); | |
| } | |
| std::string decrypted(encrypted_response.size(), '\0'); | |
| size_t decrypted_len; | |
| // Decrypt with initialized AEAD context. | |
| // response, error = Open(aead_key, aead_nonce, "", ct) | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2-6 | |
| if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open( | |
| common_ops_st.value().aead_ctx.get(), | |
| reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(decrypted.data()), &decrypted_len, | |
| decrypted.size(), | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>( | |
| common_ops_st.value().aead_nonce.data()), | |
| aead_params_st.value().aead_nonce_len, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(encrypted_response.data()), | |
| encrypted_response.size(), nullptr, 0)) { | |
| return SslErrorAsStatus( | |
| "Failed to decrypt the response with derived AEAD key and nonce."); | |
| } | |
| decrypted.resize(decrypted_len); | |
| ObliviousHttpResponse oblivious_response(std::move(encrypted_data), | |
| std::move(decrypted)); | |
| return oblivious_response; | |
| } | |
| // Response Encapsulation. | |
| // Follows the Ohttp spec section-4.2 (Encapsulation of Responses) Ref | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2 | |
| // Use HPKE context from BoringSSL to export a secret and use it to Seal (AKA | |
| // encrypt) the response back to the Sender(client) | |
| absl::StatusOr<ObliviousHttpResponse> | |
| ObliviousHttpResponse::CreateServerObliviousResponse( | |
| std::string plaintext_payload, | |
| ObliviousHttpRequest::Context& oblivious_http_request_context, | |
| QuicheRandom* quiche_random) { | |
| if (oblivious_http_request_context.hpke_context_ == nullptr) { | |
| return absl::FailedPreconditionError( | |
| "HPKE context wasn't initialized before proceeding with this Response " | |
| "Encapsulation on Server-side."); | |
| } | |
| size_t expected_key_len = EVP_HPKE_KEM_enc_len( | |
| EVP_HPKE_CTX_kem(oblivious_http_request_context.hpke_context_.get())); | |
| if (oblivious_http_request_context.encapsulated_key_.size() != | |
| expected_key_len) { | |
| return absl::InvalidArgumentError(absl::StrCat( | |
| "Invalid len for encapsulated_key arg. Expected:", expected_key_len, | |
| " Actual:", oblivious_http_request_context.encapsulated_key_.size())); | |
| } | |
| if (plaintext_payload.empty()) { | |
| return absl::InvalidArgumentError("Empty plaintext_payload input param."); | |
| } | |
| absl::StatusOr<CommonAeadParamsResult> aead_params_st = | |
| GetCommonAeadParams(oblivious_http_request_context); | |
| if (!aead_params_st.ok()) { | |
| return aead_params_st.status(); | |
| } | |
| const size_t nonce_size = aead_params_st->secret_len; | |
| const size_t max_encrypted_data_size = | |
| nonce_size + plaintext_payload.size() + | |
| EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(EVP_HPKE_AEAD_aead(EVP_HPKE_CTX_aead( | |
| oblivious_http_request_context.hpke_context_.get()))); | |
| std::string encrypted_data(max_encrypted_data_size, '\0'); | |
| // response_nonce = random(max(Nn, Nk)) | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2-2.2 | |
| random(quiche_random, encrypted_data.data(), nonce_size); | |
| absl::string_view response_nonce = | |
| absl::string_view(encrypted_data).substr(0, nonce_size); | |
| // Steps (1, 3 to 5) + AEAD context SetUp before 6th step is performed in | |
| // CommonOperations. | |
| auto common_ops_st = CommonOperationsToEncapDecap( | |
| response_nonce, oblivious_http_request_context, | |
| aead_params_st.value().aead_key_len, | |
| aead_params_st.value().aead_nonce_len, aead_params_st.value().secret_len); | |
| if (!common_ops_st.ok()) { | |
| return common_ops_st.status(); | |
| } | |
| // ct = Seal(aead_key, aead_nonce, "", response) | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2-2.6 | |
| size_t ciphertext_len; | |
| if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal( | |
| common_ops_st.value().aead_ctx.get(), | |
| reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(encrypted_data.data() + nonce_size), | |
| &ciphertext_len, encrypted_data.size() - nonce_size, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>( | |
| common_ops_st.value().aead_nonce.data()), | |
| aead_params_st.value().aead_nonce_len, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(plaintext_payload.data()), | |
| plaintext_payload.size(), nullptr, 0)) { | |
| return SslErrorAsStatus( | |
| "Failed to encrypt the payload with derived AEAD key."); | |
| } | |
| encrypted_data.resize(nonce_size + ciphertext_len); | |
| if (nonce_size == 0 || ciphertext_len == 0) { | |
| return absl::InternalError(absl::StrCat( | |
| "ObliviousHttpResponse Object wasn't initialized with required fields.", | |
| (nonce_size == 0 ? "Generated nonce is empty." : ""), | |
| (ciphertext_len == 0 ? "Generated Encrypted payload is empty." : ""))); | |
| } | |
| ObliviousHttpResponse oblivious_response(std::move(encrypted_data), | |
| std::move(plaintext_payload)); | |
| return oblivious_response; | |
| } | |
| // Serialize. | |
| // enc_response = concat(response_nonce, ct) | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2-4 | |
| const std::string& ObliviousHttpResponse::EncapsulateAndSerialize() const { | |
| return encrypted_data_; | |
| } | |
| // Decrypted blob. | |
| const std::string& ObliviousHttpResponse::GetPlaintextData() const { | |
| return response_plaintext_; | |
| } | |
| // This section mainly deals with common operations performed by both | |
| // Sender(client) and Receiver(gateway) on ObliviousHttpResponse. | |
| absl::StatusOr<ObliviousHttpResponse::CommonAeadParamsResult> | |
| ObliviousHttpResponse::GetCommonAeadParams( | |
| ObliviousHttpRequest::Context& oblivious_http_request_context) { | |
| const EVP_AEAD* evp_hpke_aead = EVP_HPKE_AEAD_aead( | |
| EVP_HPKE_CTX_aead(oblivious_http_request_context.hpke_context_.get())); | |
| if (evp_hpke_aead == nullptr) { | |
| return absl::FailedPreconditionError( | |
| "Key Configuration not supported by HPKE AEADs. Check your key " | |
| "config."); | |
| } | |
| // Nk = [AEAD key len], is determined by BoringSSL. | |
| const size_t aead_key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(evp_hpke_aead); | |
| // Nn = [AEAD nonce len], is determined by BoringSSL. | |
| const size_t aead_nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(evp_hpke_aead); | |
| const size_t secret_len = std::max(aead_key_len, aead_nonce_len); | |
| CommonAeadParamsResult result{evp_hpke_aead, aead_key_len, aead_nonce_len, | |
| secret_len}; | |
| return result; | |
| } | |
| // Common Steps of AEAD key and AEAD nonce derivation common to both | |
| // client(decapsulation) & Gateway(encapsulation) in handling | |
| // Oblivious-Response. Ref Steps (1, 3-to-5, and setting up AEAD context in | |
| // preparation for 6th step's Seal/Open) in spec. | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2-4 | |
| absl::StatusOr<ObliviousHttpResponse::CommonOperationsResult> | |
| ObliviousHttpResponse::CommonOperationsToEncapDecap( | |
| absl::string_view response_nonce, | |
| ObliviousHttpRequest::Context& oblivious_http_request_context, | |
| const size_t aead_key_len, const size_t aead_nonce_len, | |
| const size_t secret_len) { | |
| if (response_nonce.empty()) { | |
| return absl::InvalidArgumentError("Invalid input params."); | |
| } | |
| // secret = context.Export("message/bhttp response", Nk) | |
| // Export secret of len [max(Nn, Nk)] where Nk and Nn are the length of AEAD | |
| // key and nonce associated with context. | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2-2.1 | |
| std::string secret(secret_len, '\0'); | |
| absl::string_view resp_label = | |
| ObliviousHttpHeaderKeyConfig::kOhttpResponseLabel; | |
| if (!EVP_HPKE_CTX_export(oblivious_http_request_context.hpke_context_.get(), | |
| reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(secret.data()), | |
| secret.size(), | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(resp_label.data()), | |
| resp_label.size())) { | |
| return SslErrorAsStatus("Failed to export secret."); | |
| } | |
| // salt = concat(enc, response_nonce) | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2-2.3 | |
| std::string salt = absl::StrCat( | |
| oblivious_http_request_context.encapsulated_key_, response_nonce); | |
| // prk = Extract(salt, secret) | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2-2.3 | |
| std::string pseudorandom_key(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, '\0'); | |
| size_t prk_len; | |
| auto evp_md = EVP_HPKE_KDF_hkdf_md( | |
| EVP_HPKE_CTX_kdf(oblivious_http_request_context.hpke_context_.get())); | |
| if (evp_md == nullptr) { | |
| QUICHE_BUG(Invalid Key Configuration | |
| : Unsupported BoringSSL HPKE KDFs) | |
| << "Update KeyConfig to support only BoringSSL HKDFs."; | |
| return absl::FailedPreconditionError( | |
| "Key Configuration not supported by BoringSSL HPKE KDFs. Check your " | |
| "Key " | |
| "Config."); | |
| } | |
| if (!HKDF_extract( | |
| reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(pseudorandom_key.data()), &prk_len, evp_md, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(secret.data()), secret_len, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(salt.data()), salt.size())) { | |
| return SslErrorAsStatus( | |
| "Failed to derive pesudorandom key from salt and secret."); | |
| } | |
| pseudorandom_key.resize(prk_len); | |
| // aead_key = Expand(prk, "key", Nk) | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2-2.4 | |
| std::string aead_key(aead_key_len, '\0'); | |
| absl::string_view hkdf_info = ObliviousHttpHeaderKeyConfig::kKeyHkdfInfo; | |
| // All currently supported KDFs are HKDF-based. See CheckKdfId in | |
| // `ObliviousHttpHeaderKeyConfig`. | |
| if (!HKDF_expand(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(aead_key.data()), aead_key_len, | |
| evp_md, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(pseudorandom_key.data()), | |
| prk_len, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(hkdf_info.data()), | |
| hkdf_info.size())) { | |
| return SslErrorAsStatus( | |
| "Failed to expand AEAD key using pseudorandom key(prk)."); | |
| } | |
| // aead_nonce = Expand(prk, "nonce", Nn) | |
| // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-03.html#section-4.2-2.5 | |
| std::string aead_nonce(aead_nonce_len, '\0'); | |
| hkdf_info = ObliviousHttpHeaderKeyConfig::kNonceHkdfInfo; | |
| // All currently supported KDFs are HKDF-based. See CheckKdfId in | |
| // `ObliviousHttpHeaderKeyConfig`. | |
| if (!HKDF_expand(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(aead_nonce.data()), | |
| aead_nonce_len, evp_md, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(pseudorandom_key.data()), | |
| prk_len, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(hkdf_info.data()), | |
| hkdf_info.size())) { | |
| return SslErrorAsStatus( | |
| "Failed to expand AEAD nonce using pseudorandom key(prk)."); | |
| } | |
| const EVP_AEAD* evp_hpke_aead = EVP_HPKE_AEAD_aead( | |
| EVP_HPKE_CTX_aead(oblivious_http_request_context.hpke_context_.get())); | |
| if (evp_hpke_aead == nullptr) { | |
| return absl::FailedPreconditionError( | |
| "Key Configuration not supported by HPKE AEADs. Check your key " | |
| "config."); | |
| } | |
| // Setup AEAD context for subsequent Seal/Open operation in response handling. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_AEAD_CTX> aead_ctx(EVP_AEAD_CTX_new( | |
| evp_hpke_aead, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(aead_key.data()), | |
| aead_key.size(), 0)); | |
| if (aead_ctx == nullptr) { | |
| return SslErrorAsStatus("Failed to initialize AEAD context."); | |
| } | |
| if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(aead_ctx.get(), evp_hpke_aead, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(aead_key.data()), | |
| aead_key.size(), 0, nullptr)) { | |
| return SslErrorAsStatus( | |
| "Failed to initialize AEAD context with derived key."); | |
| } | |
| CommonOperationsResult result{std::move(aead_ctx), std::move(aead_nonce)}; | |
| return result; | |
| } | |
| } // namespace quiche |