gfe-relnote: In QUIC, add anti-amplification limit. Protected by version T099.
Anti-amplification limit kicks in before address validation. Now, server can only validate address by processing HANDSHAKE encrypted packet since address validation via token is not implemented.
In T099, deprecate HANDSHAKE_MODE and PTO is armed when 1) handshake is not confirmed 2) or there is packets in flight. Such that when PTO fires, at least 1 packet is sent to avoid handshake deadlock due to anti-amplification limit in case of packet losses.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 264960590
Change-Id: Ib2d9749b773af9328f96c176a49b2505be006b00
diff --git a/quic/test_tools/crypto_test_utils.cc b/quic/test_tools/crypto_test_utils.cc
index e3e649e..27e47b2 100644
--- a/quic/test_tools/crypto_test_utils.cc
+++ b/quic/test_tools/crypto_test_utils.cc
@@ -692,6 +692,8 @@
// them into |framer|, perform the decryption with them, and then swap ther
// back.
QuicConnectionPeer::SwapCrypters(dest_conn, framer.framer());
+ QuicConnectionPeer::AddBytesReceived(
+ dest_conn, source_conn->encrypted_packets_[index]->length());
if (!framer.ProcessPacket(*source_conn->encrypted_packets_[index])) {
// The framer will be unable to decrypt forward-secure packets sent after
// the handshake is complete. Don't treat them as handshake packets.
