Project import generated by Copybara.

PiperOrigin-RevId: 237361882
Change-Id: I109a68f44db867b20f8c6a7732b0ce657133e52a
diff --git a/quic/core/quic_crypto_client_handshaker.cc b/quic/core/quic_crypto_client_handshaker.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6647061
--- /dev/null
+++ b/quic/core/quic_crypto_client_handshaker.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,696 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "net/third_party/quiche/src/quic/core/quic_crypto_client_handshaker.h"
+
+#include <memory>
+
+#include "net/third_party/quiche/src/quic/core/crypto/crypto_protocol.h"
+#include "net/third_party/quiche/src/quic/core/crypto/crypto_utils.h"
+#include "net/third_party/quiche/src/quic/core/quic_session.h"
+#include "net/third_party/quiche/src/quic/platform/api/quic_client_stats.h"
+#include "net/third_party/quiche/src/quic/platform/api/quic_flags.h"
+#include "net/third_party/quiche/src/quic/platform/api/quic_logging.h"
+#include "net/third_party/quiche/src/quic/platform/api/quic_str_cat.h"
+#include "net/third_party/quiche/src/quic/platform/api/quic_string.h"
+
+namespace quic {
+
+QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl::
+    ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl(QuicCryptoClientHandshaker* parent)
+    : parent_(parent) {}
+
+QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl::
+    ~ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl() {}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl::Run(
+    std::unique_ptr<ChannelIDKey>* channel_id_key) {
+  if (parent_ == nullptr) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  parent_->channel_id_key_ = std::move(*channel_id_key);
+  parent_->channel_id_source_callback_run_ = true;
+  parent_->channel_id_source_callback_ = nullptr;
+  parent_->DoHandshakeLoop(nullptr);
+
+  // The ChannelIDSource owns this object and will delete it when this method
+  // returns.
+}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl::Cancel() {
+  parent_ = nullptr;
+}
+
+QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::ProofVerifierCallbackImpl::
+    ProofVerifierCallbackImpl(QuicCryptoClientHandshaker* parent)
+    : parent_(parent) {}
+
+QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::ProofVerifierCallbackImpl::
+    ~ProofVerifierCallbackImpl() {}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::ProofVerifierCallbackImpl::Run(
+    bool ok,
+    const QuicString& error_details,
+    std::unique_ptr<ProofVerifyDetails>* details) {
+  if (parent_ == nullptr) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  parent_->verify_ok_ = ok;
+  parent_->verify_error_details_ = error_details;
+  parent_->verify_details_ = std::move(*details);
+  parent_->proof_verify_callback_ = nullptr;
+  parent_->DoHandshakeLoop(nullptr);
+
+  // The ProofVerifier owns this object and will delete it when this method
+  // returns.
+}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::ProofVerifierCallbackImpl::Cancel() {
+  parent_ = nullptr;
+}
+
+QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::QuicCryptoClientHandshaker(
+    const QuicServerId& server_id,
+    QuicCryptoClientStream* stream,
+    QuicSession* session,
+    std::unique_ptr<ProofVerifyContext> verify_context,
+    QuicCryptoClientConfig* crypto_config,
+    QuicCryptoClientStream::ProofHandler* proof_handler)
+    : QuicCryptoHandshaker(stream, session),
+      stream_(stream),
+      session_(session),
+      next_state_(STATE_IDLE),
+      num_client_hellos_(0),
+      crypto_config_(crypto_config),
+      server_id_(server_id),
+      generation_counter_(0),
+      channel_id_sent_(false),
+      channel_id_source_callback_run_(false),
+      channel_id_source_callback_(nullptr),
+      verify_context_(std::move(verify_context)),
+      proof_verify_callback_(nullptr),
+      proof_handler_(proof_handler),
+      verify_ok_(false),
+      stateless_reject_received_(false),
+      proof_verify_start_time_(QuicTime::Zero()),
+      num_scup_messages_received_(0),
+      encryption_established_(false),
+      handshake_confirmed_(false),
+      crypto_negotiated_params_(new QuicCryptoNegotiatedParameters) {}
+
+QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::~QuicCryptoClientHandshaker() {
+  if (channel_id_source_callback_) {
+    channel_id_source_callback_->Cancel();
+  }
+  if (proof_verify_callback_) {
+    proof_verify_callback_->Cancel();
+  }
+}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::OnHandshakeMessage(
+    const CryptoHandshakeMessage& message) {
+  QuicCryptoHandshaker::OnHandshakeMessage(message);
+  if (message.tag() == kSCUP) {
+    if (!handshake_confirmed()) {
+      stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
+          QUIC_CRYPTO_UPDATE_BEFORE_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE,
+          "Early SCUP disallowed");
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // |message| is an update from the server, so we treat it differently from a
+    // handshake message.
+    HandleServerConfigUpdateMessage(message);
+    num_scup_messages_received_++;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Do not process handshake messages after the handshake is confirmed.
+  if (handshake_confirmed()) {
+    stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
+        QUIC_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_AFTER_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE,
+        "Unexpected handshake message");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  DoHandshakeLoop(&message);
+}
+
+bool QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::CryptoConnect() {
+  next_state_ = STATE_INITIALIZE;
+  DoHandshakeLoop(nullptr);
+  return session()->connection()->connected();
+}
+
+int QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::num_sent_client_hellos() const {
+  return num_client_hellos_;
+}
+
+int QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::num_scup_messages_received() const {
+  return num_scup_messages_received_;
+}
+
+bool QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::WasChannelIDSent() const {
+  return channel_id_sent_;
+}
+
+bool QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::WasChannelIDSourceCallbackRun() const {
+  return channel_id_source_callback_run_;
+}
+
+QuicString QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::chlo_hash() const {
+  return chlo_hash_;
+}
+
+bool QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::encryption_established() const {
+  return encryption_established_;
+}
+
+bool QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::handshake_confirmed() const {
+  return handshake_confirmed_;
+}
+
+const QuicCryptoNegotiatedParameters&
+QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::crypto_negotiated_params() const {
+  return *crypto_negotiated_params_;
+}
+
+CryptoMessageParser* QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::crypto_message_parser() {
+  return QuicCryptoHandshaker::crypto_message_parser();
+}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::HandleServerConfigUpdateMessage(
+    const CryptoHandshakeMessage& server_config_update) {
+  DCHECK(server_config_update.tag() == kSCUP);
+  QuicString error_details;
+  QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached =
+      crypto_config_->LookupOrCreate(server_id_);
+  QuicErrorCode error = crypto_config_->ProcessServerConfigUpdate(
+      server_config_update, session()->connection()->clock()->WallNow(),
+      session()->connection()->transport_version(), chlo_hash_, cached,
+      crypto_negotiated_params_, &error_details);
+
+  if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) {
+    stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
+        error, "Server config update invalid: " + error_details);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  DCHECK(handshake_confirmed());
+  if (proof_verify_callback_) {
+    proof_verify_callback_->Cancel();
+  }
+  next_state_ = STATE_INITIALIZE_SCUP;
+  DoHandshakeLoop(nullptr);
+}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::DoHandshakeLoop(
+    const CryptoHandshakeMessage* in) {
+  QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached =
+      crypto_config_->LookupOrCreate(server_id_);
+
+  QuicAsyncStatus rv = QUIC_SUCCESS;
+  do {
+    CHECK_NE(STATE_NONE, next_state_);
+    const State state = next_state_;
+    next_state_ = STATE_IDLE;
+    rv = QUIC_SUCCESS;
+    switch (state) {
+      case STATE_INITIALIZE:
+        DoInitialize(cached);
+        break;
+      case STATE_SEND_CHLO:
+        DoSendCHLO(cached);
+        return;  // return waiting to hear from server.
+      case STATE_RECV_REJ:
+        DoReceiveREJ(in, cached);
+        break;
+      case STATE_VERIFY_PROOF:
+        rv = DoVerifyProof(cached);
+        break;
+      case STATE_VERIFY_PROOF_COMPLETE:
+        DoVerifyProofComplete(cached);
+        break;
+      case STATE_GET_CHANNEL_ID:
+        rv = DoGetChannelID(cached);
+        break;
+      case STATE_GET_CHANNEL_ID_COMPLETE:
+        DoGetChannelIDComplete();
+        break;
+      case STATE_RECV_SHLO:
+        DoReceiveSHLO(in, cached);
+        break;
+      case STATE_IDLE:
+        // This means that the peer sent us a message that we weren't expecting.
+        stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INVALID_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_TYPE,
+                                            "Handshake in idle state");
+        return;
+      case STATE_INITIALIZE_SCUP:
+        DoInitializeServerConfigUpdate(cached);
+        break;
+      case STATE_NONE:
+        QUIC_NOTREACHED();
+        return;  // We are done.
+    }
+  } while (rv != QUIC_PENDING && next_state_ != STATE_NONE);
+}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::DoInitialize(
+    QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached) {
+  if (!cached->IsEmpty() && !cached->signature().empty()) {
+    // Note that we verify the proof even if the cached proof is valid.
+    // This allows us to respond to CA trust changes or certificate
+    // expiration because it may have been a while since we last verified
+    // the proof.
+    DCHECK(crypto_config_->proof_verifier());
+    // Track proof verification time when cached server config is used.
+    proof_verify_start_time_ = session()->connection()->clock()->Now();
+    chlo_hash_ = cached->chlo_hash();
+    // If the cached state needs to be verified, do it now.
+    next_state_ = STATE_VERIFY_PROOF;
+  } else {
+    next_state_ = STATE_GET_CHANNEL_ID;
+  }
+}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::DoSendCHLO(
+    QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached) {
+  if (stateless_reject_received_) {
+    // If we've gotten to this point, we've sent at least one hello
+    // and received a stateless reject in response.  We cannot
+    // continue to send hellos because the server has abandoned state
+    // for this connection.  Abandon further handshakes.
+    next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
+    if (session()->connection()->connected()) {
+      session()->connection()->CloseConnection(
+          QUIC_CRYPTO_HANDSHAKE_STATELESS_REJECT, "stateless reject received",
+          ConnectionCloseBehavior::SILENT_CLOSE);
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Send the client hello in plaintext.
+  session()->connection()->SetDefaultEncryptionLevel(ENCRYPTION_NONE);
+  encryption_established_ = false;
+  if (num_client_hellos_ > QuicCryptoClientStream::kMaxClientHellos) {
+    stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
+        QUIC_CRYPTO_TOO_MANY_REJECTS,
+        QuicStrCat("More than ", QuicCryptoClientStream::kMaxClientHellos,
+                   " rejects"));
+    return;
+  }
+  num_client_hellos_++;
+
+  CryptoHandshakeMessage out;
+  DCHECK(session() != nullptr);
+  DCHECK(session()->config() != nullptr);
+  // Send all the options, regardless of whether we're sending an
+  // inchoate or subsequent hello.
+  session()->config()->ToHandshakeMessage(&out);
+
+  if (!cached->IsComplete(session()->connection()->clock()->WallNow())) {
+    crypto_config_->FillInchoateClientHello(
+        server_id_, session()->supported_versions().front(), cached,
+        session()->connection()->random_generator(),
+        /* demand_x509_proof= */ true, crypto_negotiated_params_, &out);
+    // Pad the inchoate client hello to fill up a packet.
+    const QuicByteCount kFramingOverhead = 50;  // A rough estimate.
+    const QuicByteCount max_packet_size =
+        session()->connection()->max_packet_length();
+    if (max_packet_size <= kFramingOverhead) {
+      QUIC_DLOG(DFATAL) << "max_packet_length (" << max_packet_size
+                        << ") has no room for framing overhead.";
+      stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                                          "max_packet_size too smalll");
+      return;
+    }
+    if (kClientHelloMinimumSize > max_packet_size - kFramingOverhead) {
+      QUIC_DLOG(DFATAL) << "Client hello won't fit in a single packet.";
+      stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                                          "CHLO too large");
+      return;
+    }
+    next_state_ = STATE_RECV_REJ;
+    CryptoUtils::HashHandshakeMessage(out, &chlo_hash_, Perspective::IS_CLIENT);
+    session()->connection()->set_fully_pad_crypto_hadshake_packets(
+        crypto_config_->pad_inchoate_hello());
+    SendHandshakeMessage(out);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // If the server nonce is empty, copy over the server nonce from a previous
+  // SREJ, if there is one.
+  if (GetQuicReloadableFlag(enable_quic_stateless_reject_support) &&
+      crypto_negotiated_params_->server_nonce.empty() &&
+      cached->has_server_nonce()) {
+    crypto_negotiated_params_->server_nonce = cached->GetNextServerNonce();
+    DCHECK(!crypto_negotiated_params_->server_nonce.empty());
+  }
+
+  QuicString error_details;
+  QuicErrorCode error = crypto_config_->FillClientHello(
+      server_id_, session()->connection()->connection_id(),
+      session()->supported_versions().front(), cached,
+      session()->connection()->clock()->WallNow(),
+      session()->connection()->random_generator(), channel_id_key_.get(),
+      crypto_negotiated_params_, &out, &error_details);
+  if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) {
+    // Flush the cached config so that, if it's bad, the server has a
+    // chance to send us another in the future.
+    cached->InvalidateServerConfig();
+    stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(error, error_details);
+    return;
+  }
+  CryptoUtils::HashHandshakeMessage(out, &chlo_hash_, Perspective::IS_CLIENT);
+  channel_id_sent_ = (channel_id_key_ != nullptr);
+  if (cached->proof_verify_details()) {
+    proof_handler_->OnProofVerifyDetailsAvailable(
+        *cached->proof_verify_details());
+  }
+  next_state_ = STATE_RECV_SHLO;
+  session()->connection()->set_fully_pad_crypto_hadshake_packets(
+      crypto_config_->pad_full_hello());
+  SendHandshakeMessage(out);
+  // Be prepared to decrypt with the new server write key.
+  session()->connection()->SetAlternativeDecrypter(
+      ENCRYPTION_ZERO_RTT,
+      std::move(crypto_negotiated_params_->initial_crypters.decrypter),
+      true /* latch once used */);
+  // Send subsequent packets under encryption on the assumption that the
+  // server will accept the handshake.
+  session()->connection()->SetEncrypter(
+      ENCRYPTION_ZERO_RTT,
+      std::move(crypto_negotiated_params_->initial_crypters.encrypter));
+  session()->connection()->SetDefaultEncryptionLevel(ENCRYPTION_ZERO_RTT);
+
+  // TODO(ianswett): Merge ENCRYPTION_REESTABLISHED and
+  // ENCRYPTION_FIRST_ESTABLSIHED
+  encryption_established_ = true;
+  session()->OnCryptoHandshakeEvent(QuicSession::ENCRYPTION_REESTABLISHED);
+}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::DoReceiveREJ(
+    const CryptoHandshakeMessage* in,
+    QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached) {
+  // We sent a dummy CHLO because we didn't have enough information to
+  // perform a handshake, or we sent a full hello that the server
+  // rejected. Here we hope to have a REJ that contains the information
+  // that we need.
+  if ((in->tag() != kREJ) && (in->tag() != kSREJ)) {
+    next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
+    stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INVALID_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_TYPE,
+                                        "Expected REJ");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  QuicTagVector reject_reasons;
+  static_assert(sizeof(QuicTag) == sizeof(uint32_t), "header out of sync");
+  if (in->GetTaglist(kRREJ, &reject_reasons) == QUIC_NO_ERROR) {
+    uint32_t packed_error = 0;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < reject_reasons.size(); ++i) {
+      // HANDSHAKE_OK is 0 and don't report that as error.
+      if (reject_reasons[i] == HANDSHAKE_OK || reject_reasons[i] >= 32) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      HandshakeFailureReason reason =
+          static_cast<HandshakeFailureReason>(reject_reasons[i]);
+      packed_error |= 1 << (reason - 1);
+    }
+    DVLOG(1) << "Reasons for rejection: " << packed_error;
+    if (num_client_hellos_ == QuicCryptoClientStream::kMaxClientHellos) {
+      QuicClientSparseHistogram("QuicClientHelloRejectReasons.TooMany",
+                                packed_error);
+    }
+    QuicClientSparseHistogram("QuicClientHelloRejectReasons.Secure",
+                              packed_error);
+  }
+
+  // Receipt of a REJ message means that the server received the CHLO
+  // so we can cancel and retransmissions.
+  session()->NeuterUnencryptedData();
+
+  stateless_reject_received_ = in->tag() == kSREJ;
+  QuicString error_details;
+  QuicErrorCode error = crypto_config_->ProcessRejection(
+      *in, session()->connection()->clock()->WallNow(),
+      session()->connection()->transport_version(), chlo_hash_, cached,
+      crypto_negotiated_params_, &error_details);
+
+  if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) {
+    next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
+    stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(error, error_details);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!cached->proof_valid()) {
+    if (!cached->signature().empty()) {
+      // Note that we only verify the proof if the cached proof is not
+      // valid. If the cached proof is valid here, someone else must have
+      // just added the server config to the cache and verified the proof,
+      // so we can assume no CA trust changes or certificate expiration
+      // has happened since then.
+      next_state_ = STATE_VERIFY_PROOF;
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+  next_state_ = STATE_GET_CHANNEL_ID;
+}
+
+QuicAsyncStatus QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::DoVerifyProof(
+    QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached) {
+  ProofVerifier* verifier = crypto_config_->proof_verifier();
+  DCHECK(verifier);
+  next_state_ = STATE_VERIFY_PROOF_COMPLETE;
+  generation_counter_ = cached->generation_counter();
+
+  ProofVerifierCallbackImpl* proof_verify_callback =
+      new ProofVerifierCallbackImpl(this);
+
+  verify_ok_ = false;
+
+  QuicAsyncStatus status = verifier->VerifyProof(
+      server_id_.host(), server_id_.port(), cached->server_config(),
+      session()->connection()->transport_version(), chlo_hash_, cached->certs(),
+      cached->cert_sct(), cached->signature(), verify_context_.get(),
+      &verify_error_details_, &verify_details_,
+      std::unique_ptr<ProofVerifierCallback>(proof_verify_callback));
+
+  switch (status) {
+    case QUIC_PENDING:
+      proof_verify_callback_ = proof_verify_callback;
+      QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Doing VerifyProof";
+      break;
+    case QUIC_FAILURE:
+      break;
+    case QUIC_SUCCESS:
+      verify_ok_ = true;
+      break;
+  }
+  return status;
+}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::DoVerifyProofComplete(
+    QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached) {
+  if (proof_verify_start_time_.IsInitialized()) {
+    QUIC_CLIENT_HISTOGRAM_TIMES(
+        "QuicSession.VerifyProofTime.CachedServerConfig",
+        (session()->connection()->clock()->Now() - proof_verify_start_time_),
+        QuicTime::Delta::FromMilliseconds(1), QuicTime::Delta::FromSeconds(10),
+        50, "");
+  }
+  if (!verify_ok_) {
+    if (verify_details_) {
+      proof_handler_->OnProofVerifyDetailsAvailable(*verify_details_);
+    }
+    if (num_client_hellos_ == 0) {
+      cached->Clear();
+      next_state_ = STATE_INITIALIZE;
+      return;
+    }
+    next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
+    QUIC_CLIENT_HISTOGRAM_BOOL("QuicVerifyProofFailed.HandshakeConfirmed",
+                               handshake_confirmed(), "");
+    stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
+        QUIC_PROOF_INVALID, "Proof invalid: " + verify_error_details_);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Check if generation_counter has changed between STATE_VERIFY_PROOF and
+  // STATE_VERIFY_PROOF_COMPLETE state changes.
+  if (generation_counter_ != cached->generation_counter()) {
+    next_state_ = STATE_VERIFY_PROOF;
+  } else {
+    SetCachedProofValid(cached);
+    cached->SetProofVerifyDetails(verify_details_.release());
+    if (!handshake_confirmed()) {
+      next_state_ = STATE_GET_CHANNEL_ID;
+    } else {
+      // TODO: Enable Expect-Staple. https://crbug.com/631101
+      next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+QuicAsyncStatus QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::DoGetChannelID(
+    QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached) {
+  next_state_ = STATE_GET_CHANNEL_ID_COMPLETE;
+  channel_id_key_.reset();
+  if (!RequiresChannelID(cached)) {
+    next_state_ = STATE_SEND_CHLO;
+    return QUIC_SUCCESS;
+  }
+
+  ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl* channel_id_source_callback =
+      new ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl(this);
+  QuicAsyncStatus status = crypto_config_->channel_id_source()->GetChannelIDKey(
+      server_id_.host(), &channel_id_key_, channel_id_source_callback);
+
+  switch (status) {
+    case QUIC_PENDING:
+      channel_id_source_callback_ = channel_id_source_callback;
+      QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Looking up channel ID";
+      break;
+    case QUIC_FAILURE:
+      next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
+      delete channel_id_source_callback;
+      stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INVALID_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE,
+                                          "Channel ID lookup failed");
+      break;
+    case QUIC_SUCCESS:
+      delete channel_id_source_callback;
+      break;
+  }
+  return status;
+}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::DoGetChannelIDComplete() {
+  if (!channel_id_key_.get()) {
+    next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
+    stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INVALID_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE,
+                                        "Channel ID lookup failed");
+    return;
+  }
+  next_state_ = STATE_SEND_CHLO;
+}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::DoReceiveSHLO(
+    const CryptoHandshakeMessage* in,
+    QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached) {
+  next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
+  // We sent a CHLO that we expected to be accepted and now we're
+  // hoping for a SHLO from the server to confirm that.  First check
+  // to see whether the response was a reject, and if so, move on to
+  // the reject-processing state.
+  if ((in->tag() == kREJ) || (in->tag() == kSREJ)) {
+    // alternative_decrypter will be nullptr if the original alternative
+    // decrypter latched and became the primary decrypter. That happens
+    // if we received a message encrypted with the INITIAL key.
+    if (session()->connection()->alternative_decrypter() == nullptr) {
+      // The rejection was sent encrypted!
+      stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
+          QUIC_CRYPTO_ENCRYPTION_LEVEL_INCORRECT, "encrypted REJ message");
+      return;
+    }
+    next_state_ = STATE_RECV_REJ;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (in->tag() != kSHLO) {
+    stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INVALID_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_TYPE,
+                                        "Expected SHLO or REJ");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // alternative_decrypter will be nullptr if the original alternative
+  // decrypter latched and became the primary decrypter. That happens
+  // if we received a message encrypted with the INITIAL key.
+  if (session()->connection()->alternative_decrypter() != nullptr) {
+    // The server hello was sent without encryption.
+    stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_CRYPTO_ENCRYPTION_LEVEL_INCORRECT,
+                                        "unencrypted SHLO message");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  QuicString error_details;
+  QuicErrorCode error = crypto_config_->ProcessServerHello(
+      *in, session()->connection()->connection_id(),
+      session()->connection()->version(),
+      session()->connection()->server_supported_versions(), cached,
+      crypto_negotiated_params_, &error_details);
+
+  if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) {
+    stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
+        error, "Server hello invalid: " + error_details);
+    return;
+  }
+  error = session()->config()->ProcessPeerHello(*in, SERVER, &error_details);
+  if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) {
+    stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
+        error, "Server hello invalid: " + error_details);
+    return;
+  }
+  session()->OnConfigNegotiated();
+
+  CrypterPair* crypters = &crypto_negotiated_params_->forward_secure_crypters;
+  // TODO(agl): we don't currently latch this decrypter because the idea
+  // has been floated that the server shouldn't send packets encrypted
+  // with the FORWARD_SECURE key until it receives a FORWARD_SECURE
+  // packet from the client.
+  session()->connection()->SetAlternativeDecrypter(
+      ENCRYPTION_FORWARD_SECURE, std::move(crypters->decrypter),
+      false /* don't latch */);
+  session()->connection()->SetEncrypter(ENCRYPTION_FORWARD_SECURE,
+                                        std::move(crypters->encrypter));
+  session()->connection()->SetDefaultEncryptionLevel(ENCRYPTION_FORWARD_SECURE);
+
+  handshake_confirmed_ = true;
+  session()->OnCryptoHandshakeEvent(QuicSession::HANDSHAKE_CONFIRMED);
+  session()->connection()->OnHandshakeComplete();
+}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::DoInitializeServerConfigUpdate(
+    QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached) {
+  bool update_ignored = false;
+  if (!cached->IsEmpty() && !cached->signature().empty()) {
+    // Note that we verify the proof even if the cached proof is valid.
+    DCHECK(crypto_config_->proof_verifier());
+    next_state_ = STATE_VERIFY_PROOF;
+  } else {
+    update_ignored = true;
+    next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
+  }
+  QUIC_CLIENT_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("QuicNumServerConfig.UpdateMessagesIgnored",
+                               update_ignored, 1, 1000000, 50, "");
+}
+
+void QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::SetCachedProofValid(
+    QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached) {
+  cached->SetProofValid();
+  proof_handler_->OnProofValid(*cached);
+}
+
+bool QuicCryptoClientHandshaker::RequiresChannelID(
+    QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached) {
+  if (server_id_.privacy_mode_enabled() ||
+      !crypto_config_->channel_id_source()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const CryptoHandshakeMessage* scfg = cached->GetServerConfig();
+  if (!scfg) {  // scfg may be null then we send an inchoate CHLO.
+    return false;
+  }
+  QuicTagVector their_proof_demands;
+  if (scfg->GetTaglist(kPDMD, &their_proof_demands) != QUIC_NO_ERROR) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  for (const QuicTag tag : their_proof_demands) {
+    if (tag == kCHID) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+}  // namespace quic