Change QuicStream::CloseConnectionWithDetails() to QuicStream::OnUnrecoverableError.
The stream shouldn't be able to instruct the session on what to do. Instead, it should just report its state change and let the session handle it.
gfe-relnote: name change only. Not protected.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 294966339
Change-Id: Ibff2ed7169d0964ea5f19823445f5aa9ce8c5916
diff --git a/quic/core/quic_crypto_client_handshaker.cc b/quic/core/quic_crypto_client_handshaker.cc
index 3614433..d9e67db 100644
--- a/quic/core/quic_crypto_client_handshaker.cc
+++ b/quic/core/quic_crypto_client_handshaker.cc
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
QuicCryptoHandshaker::OnHandshakeMessage(message);
if (message.tag() == kSCUP) {
if (!one_rtt_keys_available()) {
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(
QUIC_CRYPTO_UPDATE_BEFORE_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE,
"Early SCUP disallowed");
return;
@@ -98,9 +98,8 @@
// Do not process handshake messages after the handshake is confirmed.
if (one_rtt_keys_available()) {
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
- QUIC_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_AFTER_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE,
- "Unexpected handshake message");
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(QUIC_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_AFTER_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE,
+ "Unexpected handshake message");
return;
}
@@ -184,7 +183,7 @@
crypto_negotiated_params_, &error_details);
if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) {
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(
error, "Server config update invalid: " + error_details);
return;
}
@@ -229,8 +228,8 @@
break;
case STATE_IDLE:
// This means that the peer sent us a message that we weren't expecting.
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INVALID_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_TYPE,
- "Handshake in idle state");
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(QUIC_INVALID_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_TYPE,
+ "Handshake in idle state");
return;
case STATE_INITIALIZE_SCUP:
DoInitializeServerConfigUpdate(cached);
@@ -266,7 +265,7 @@
session()->connection()->SetDefaultEncryptionLevel(ENCRYPTION_INITIAL);
encryption_established_ = false;
if (num_client_hellos_ >= QuicCryptoClientStream::kMaxClientHellos) {
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(
QUIC_CRYPTO_TOO_MANY_REJECTS,
quiche::QuicheStrCat("More than ",
QuicCryptoClientStream::kMaxClientHellos,
@@ -294,14 +293,13 @@
if (max_packet_size <= kFramingOverhead) {
QUIC_DLOG(DFATAL) << "max_packet_length (" << max_packet_size
<< ") has no room for framing overhead.";
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- "max_packet_size too smalll");
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ "max_packet_size too smalll");
return;
}
if (kClientHelloMinimumSize > max_packet_size - kFramingOverhead) {
QUIC_DLOG(DFATAL) << "Client hello won't fit in a single packet.";
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- "CHLO too large");
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR, "CHLO too large");
return;
}
next_state_ = STATE_RECV_REJ;
@@ -324,7 +322,7 @@
// Flush the cached config so that, if it's bad, the server has a
// chance to send us another in the future.
cached->InvalidateServerConfig();
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(error, error_details);
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(error, error_details);
return;
}
chlo_hash_ = CryptoUtils::HashHandshakeMessage(out, Perspective::IS_CLIENT);
@@ -358,8 +356,8 @@
// that we need.
if (in->tag() != kREJ) {
next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INVALID_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_TYPE,
- "Expected REJ");
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(QUIC_INVALID_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_TYPE,
+ "Expected REJ");
return;
}
@@ -397,7 +395,7 @@
if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) {
next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(error, error_details);
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(error, error_details);
return;
}
if (!cached->proof_valid()) {
@@ -468,8 +466,8 @@
next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
QUIC_CLIENT_HISTOGRAM_BOOL("QuicVerifyProofFailed.HandshakeConfirmed",
one_rtt_keys_available(), "");
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
- QUIC_PROOF_INVALID, "Proof invalid: " + verify_error_details_);
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(QUIC_PROOF_INVALID,
+ "Proof invalid: " + verify_error_details_);
return;
}
@@ -501,8 +499,8 @@
// A reject message must be sent in ENCRYPTION_INITIAL.
if (session()->connection()->last_decrypted_level() != ENCRYPTION_INITIAL) {
// The rejection was sent encrypted!
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
- QUIC_CRYPTO_ENCRYPTION_LEVEL_INCORRECT, "encrypted REJ message");
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(QUIC_CRYPTO_ENCRYPTION_LEVEL_INCORRECT,
+ "encrypted REJ message");
return;
}
next_state_ = STATE_RECV_REJ;
@@ -510,7 +508,7 @@
}
if (in->tag() != kSHLO) {
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(
QUIC_INVALID_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_TYPE,
quiche::QuicheStrCat("Expected SHLO or REJ. Received: ",
QuicTagToString(in->tag())));
@@ -519,8 +517,8 @@
if (session()->connection()->last_decrypted_level() == ENCRYPTION_INITIAL) {
// The server hello was sent without encryption.
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_CRYPTO_ENCRYPTION_LEVEL_INCORRECT,
- "unencrypted SHLO message");
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(QUIC_CRYPTO_ENCRYPTION_LEVEL_INCORRECT,
+ "unencrypted SHLO message");
return;
}
@@ -532,14 +530,14 @@
crypto_negotiated_params_, &error_details);
if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) {
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
- error, "Server hello invalid: " + error_details);
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(error,
+ "Server hello invalid: " + error_details);
return;
}
error = session()->config()->ProcessPeerHello(*in, SERVER, &error_details);
if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) {
- stream_->CloseConnectionWithDetails(
- error, "Server hello invalid: " + error_details);
+ stream_->OnUnrecoverableError(error,
+ "Server hello invalid: " + error_details);
return;
}
session()->OnConfigNegotiated();
