gfe-relnote: In QUIC, split HandshakerDelegateInterface::OnNewKeysAvailable to OnNewDecryptionKeyAvailable and OnNewEncryptionKeyAvailable. Refactoring only, no behavior change, not protected.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 294260261
Change-Id: Iaa1e251970b555434833432098af11fbb0d28ebc
diff --git a/quic/core/quic_crypto_client_handshaker.cc b/quic/core/quic_crypto_client_handshaker.cc
index b815dfe..c306323 100644
--- a/quic/core/quic_crypto_client_handshaker.cc
+++ b/quic/core/quic_crypto_client_handshaker.cc
@@ -327,12 +327,14 @@
crypto_config_->pad_full_hello());
SendHandshakeMessage(out);
// Be prepared to decrypt with the new server write key.
- delegate_->OnNewKeysAvailable(
+ delegate_->OnNewEncryptionKeyAvailable(
+ ENCRYPTION_ZERO_RTT,
+ std::move(crypto_negotiated_params_->initial_crypters.encrypter));
+ delegate_->OnNewDecryptionKeyAvailable(
ENCRYPTION_ZERO_RTT,
std::move(crypto_negotiated_params_->initial_crypters.decrypter),
/*set_alternative_decrypter=*/true,
- /*latch_once_used=*/true,
- std::move(crypto_negotiated_params_->initial_crypters.encrypter));
+ /*latch_once_used=*/true);
encryption_established_ = true;
delegate_->SetDefaultEncryptionLevel(ENCRYPTION_ZERO_RTT);
}
@@ -537,10 +539,12 @@
// has been floated that the server shouldn't send packets encrypted
// with the FORWARD_SECURE key until it receives a FORWARD_SECURE
// packet from the client.
- delegate_->OnNewKeysAvailable(
- ENCRYPTION_FORWARD_SECURE, std::move(crypters->decrypter),
- /*set_alternative_decrypter=*/true,
- /*latch_once_used=*/false, std::move(crypters->encrypter));
+ delegate_->OnNewEncryptionKeyAvailable(ENCRYPTION_FORWARD_SECURE,
+ std::move(crypters->encrypter));
+ delegate_->OnNewDecryptionKeyAvailable(ENCRYPTION_FORWARD_SECURE,
+ std::move(crypters->decrypter),
+ /*set_alternative_decrypter=*/true,
+ /*latch_once_used=*/false);
one_rtt_keys_available_ = true;
delegate_->SetDefaultEncryptionLevel(ENCRYPTION_FORWARD_SECURE);
delegate_->DiscardOldEncryptionKey(ENCRYPTION_INITIAL);